Picture This: Resolving the Conflict Between Postmortem Celebrity Publicity Rights and Deceased Photographers\u27 Copyrighted Images by Ingles, Matthew S.
INGLES (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010 1:25 PM 
 
311 
PICTURE THIS: RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN 
POSTMORTEM CELEBRITY PUBLICITY RIGHTS AND 
DECEASED PHOTOGRAPHERS’ COPYRIGHTED IMAGES 
Matthew S. Ingles∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
America’s “celebrity obsession”1 has spawned the careers of 
many individuals overnight, sometimes regardless of cognizable tal-
ent.
2
  This obsession has increased the number and value of celebrity 
endorsements.
3
  In fact, by attaching themselves to a product, many 
celebrities have significantly augmented their stream of income over 
that which they obtain through the more traditional performances 
for which they are known.
4
  Furthermore, celebrities often continue 
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 1 Bruce Horovitz, The Good, Bad and Ugly of America’s Celeb Obsession, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 19, 2003, at 01B, available at 2003 WLNR 6117193 (noting that “America is en-
meshed in a harmonic convergence of celebrity infatuation”). 
 2 See, e.g., Laura M. Holson, All the Celebrities You Want, on Your Cellphone, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, at B1, available at 2008 WLNR 19923587 (discussing how Kim 
Kardashian is essentially “famous for being famous” and achieved instant celebrity 
after the release of a pornographic home video). 
 3 See generally The Celebrity 100, FORBES.COM, June 11, 2008, 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/06/11/most-powerful-celebrities-lists-celebrities08-
cx_mn_0611c_land.html. 
 4 See, e.g., The Celebrity 100: #2 Tiger Woods, FORBES, June 11, 2008, 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2008/53/celebrities08_Tiger-Woods_WR6D.html (de-
scribing Tiger Woods as holding lucrative sponsorships with Nike, Accenture, Gato-
rade, and Gillette in addition to his more traditional golf tournament prizes).  Im-
agining a well-advertised product that is not coupled with a well-known endorser is 
difficult: 
Famous faces greet us at every turn—on billboards, on television, on 
public transport, in the newspapers and magazines, and even on cereal 
boxes.  Celebrities are beginning to dominate modern society in many 
new and unprecedented ways.  Celebrities can capture the imagination 
of a nation and the purses of the people.  To be celebrated appears to 
be the apogee of success in our society, whether as an actor, a musi-
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to generate sizeable amounts of income and recognition after their 
deaths.
5
  A celebrity’s economic value after death, however, usually 
depends on the deceased’s ability to remain relevant to the public.6  
This requires that those acting on behalf of the deceased take affir-
mative steps to continue to create a public demand for the deceased’s 
celebrity. 
Because they are no longer able to create new work, deceased 
public figures, through their estates, remain current through the use 
 
cian, a professional athlete, a supermodel or a chef.  Regardless, these 
public personalities wield significant power in contemporary society 
through their associations with causes, products and events.   
David Tan, Beyond Trademark Law: What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Cultural 
Studies, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 913, 914 (2008). 
 5 See Lea Goldman & Jake Paine, Top-Earning Dead Celebrities, FORBES.COM, Oct. 
29, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/2007/10/26/top-dead-celebrity-biz-media-
deadcelebs07-cz_lg_1029celeb.html (reporting that the thirteen top-earning dead 
celebrities grossed a combined $232 million in the twelve months prior to October 
2007). 
 6 Id.  The rankings, which evaluated earnings for the period between October 
2006 and October 2007, named Elvis Presley, with forty-nine million dollars in reve-
nue, as the highest-grossing deceased celebrity.  Id.  A significant portion of this in-
come stemmed from visits to Elvis’s home and memorial museum, Graceland, which 
was renovated for the thirtieth anniversary of his death.  Id.  Although deceased for 
more than forty-five years at the time, Marilyn Monroe, grossing seven million dol-
lars, ranked ninth on the list, while musician James Brown, who passed away on 
Christmas Day 2006, generated five million dollars and ranked eleventh.  Lea Gold-
man & Jake Paine, In Pictures: Top-Earning Dead Celebrities: Marilyn Monroe, 
FORBES.COM, Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/2007/10/26/top-dead-celebrity-
biz-media-deadcelebs07-cz_lg_1029celeb_slide_10.html?thisSpeed=30000; Lea Gold-
man & Jake Paine, In Pictures: Top-Earning Dead Celebrities: James Brown, FORBES.COM, 
Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/2007/10/26/top-dead-celebrity-biz-media-
deadcelebs07-cz_lg_1029celeb_slide_12.html?thisSpeed=30000.  The economic value 
of a celebrity’s association with or endorsement of products, as well as the necessity 
of prolonged public relevance, was recognized in early publicity rights cases: 
Today, it is commonplace for individuals to promote or advertise 
commercial services and products or, as in the present case, even have 
their identities infused in the products. Individuals prominent in ath-
letics, business, entertainment and the arts, for example, are frequently 
involved in such enterprises. . . .  [C]ommercial use of an individual’s 
identity is intended to increase the value or sales of the product by fus-
ing the celebrity’s identity with the product and thereby siphoning 
some of the publicity value or good will in the celebrity’s persona into 
the product.  This use is premised, in part, on public recognition and 
association with that person’s name or likeness, or an ability to create 
such recognition. The commercial value of a particular person’s identi-
ty thus primarily depends on that person’s public visibility and the cha-
racteristics for which he or she is known. 
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures (Lugosi II), 603 P.2d 425, 437–38 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., 
dissenting). 
INGLES (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  1:25 PM 
2010] COMMENT 313 
 
of their persona
7
 in some form.
8
  In many instances, a celebrity’s per-
sona encompasses or refers to her image; however, valuable photo-
graphic images require artistic collaboration with photographers dur-
ing the celebrity’s life.9  As both celebrities and the photographers 
who helped capture and create their iconic status die, and as a result 
of both state postmortem rights of publicity
10
 and federal copyright 
law,
11
 the issue of which party has the last word as to what can be done 
with the photographs of the deceased celebrity remains unclear.
12
  
Competing interests exist between the descendible property interest 
created in the celebrity’s persona and the right of a photographer to 
exploit his art.
13
  The web of legal interests becomes even more en-
tangled where the celebrity’s estate is suing the photographer’s estate 
(rather than the celebrity suing the photographer) because such 
postulation of the parties creates adversaries out of those who never 
actually contributed any sweat equity to the work.
14
  In addition to the 
state and federal legal uncertainty, variation among the states’ post-
mortem publicity laws also contributes to the confusion.
15
  The issue 
of extending postmortem publicity rights parallels the controversial, 
yet seemingly continual, extension of copyright term lengths granted 
 
 7 A “persona” can “include[] any use of the name, portrait, voice, picture or 
‘likeness’ of the person.”  Michael Cameron, ‘Celebrities Bill’ Muzzles Press, N.Y. POST, 
June 16, 2008, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/ 
celebrities_bill_muzzles_press_WwcrlwekcGKG8zPswCKBgO. 
 8 See, e.g., Goldman & Paine, supra note 5 (noting that “Albert Einstein’s name is 
used to peddle Baby Einstein DVDs”). 
 9 See, e.g., Image Gallery of Herb Ritts, http://www.herbritts.com/images/ (last 
visited Aug. 22, 2009) (displaying iconic images of celebrities such as Al Pacino, Eliz-
abeth Taylor, Johnny Depp, and Madonna taken by deceased celebrity-photographer 
Herb Ritts). 
 10 See discussion infra Part III. 
 11 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 12 See generally Brown v. ACMI Pop Div., 873 N.E.2d 954 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (fail-
ing to address the issue when the estate of the late musician James Brown sued the 
copyright holder of several images of Brown that the holder was selling for commer-
cial uses on the grounds that such sales allegedly infringed upon Brown’s publicity 
rights). 
 13 Id.  See also discussion infra Part V. 
 14 See, e.g., Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 3939 
(CM), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67529 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2008) (addressing the publici-
ty-rights claims of the heirs of Marilyn Monroe’s estate against the heirs of the late 
photographer Sam Shaw).  The term “sweat equity” is defined as “an owner’s labor 
on improvements that increase the value of the property.”  WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1191 (1984). 
 15 See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
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to the holders of copyrighted images.
16
  In states such as California, 
which are home to countless celebrities
17
 and offer broad protection 
of publicity rights, future litigation on the issue seems unavoidable 
absent any legislative or judicial resolution.
18
 
Recently, cases involving the estates of James Brown
19
 and Ma-
rilyn Monroe
20
 provided prime examples of the sort of litigation 
created by increased persona protection by the states.  Although the 
courts in these two cases had the opportunity to confront the issue of 
whose right prevails between a photographer/copyright holder and a 
celebrity’s estate, each court decided to avoid direct analysis.  Thus, 
the first court to directly tackle the issue will set an influential stan-
dard for the rest of the country.  Meanwhile, the earning potential of 
America’s deceased celebrities and photographers hangs in the bal-
ance. 
This Comment proposes a judicial test for determining which es-
tate should have the right to exploit (or prevent exploitation of) a 
deceased celebrity’s photograph taken by a deceased photographer 
when the rights of publicity and copyright clash.  Part II of this 
Comment illustrates the need for such a test by examining the recent 
cases involving the estates of Marilyn Monroe and James Brown, each 
of which circumvented the issue when given the opportunity to con-
front it.  Part III examines the history of the postmortem right of 
publicity and discusses the movement toward stronger and lengthier 
protection by considering the current position of statutory postmor-
tem rights of publicity in relevant states.  Part IV discusses federal-
copyright law governing photographic images and examines the re-
cent trend of continually extending the duration of the Federal Cop-
yright Act.  Finally, Part V examines the reasoning for both photo-
grapher and celebrity claims and advances an equitable guideline for 
future estates to follow to avoid costly litigation. 
 
 16 See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures (Lugosi II), 603 P.2d 425, 441–42 (Cal. 1979) 
(Bird, C.J., dissenting) (fashioning the length of postmortem publicity rights to the 
protection period given to an author under copyright law); see also 3 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.01 (2008). 
 17 César G. Soriano, Celebrities Have Their Days in Court, USA TODAY, June 13, 2005, 
http://www.usatoday.com/life/people/2005-06-13-other-celeb-trials_x.htm (noting 
that most celebrities live in California). 
 18 See infra Part III.B.1.a (discussing California’s Publicity Rights statute, CAL. CIV. 
CODE § 3344.1 (West Supp. 2009)). 
 19 See Brown v. ACMI Pop Div., 873 N.E.2d 954 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
 20 See Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 3939 (CM), 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67529 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2008). 
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II. RECENT “CELEBRITY V. PHOTOGRAPHER” LITIGATION 
Copyright and publicity law conflict where celebrities’ personal 
interests appear in copyrighted works.  Issues arise because copyright 
protection is afforded by title 17 of the United States Code, while 
publicity rights are often rooted in the common law and are granted 
by individual states.  Because no national congruity exists among the 
state-created right of publicity,
21
 cases in the crosshairs could very well 
be decided differently depending on the jurisdiction.  Although a 
federal right of publicity has been advocated,
22
 Congress has taken no 
steps to determine a standard for resolving this conflict.  While the 
legislature is the natural forum to resolve this conflict, because Con-
gress seems uninterested, the judiciary is left to balance the rights of 
each party. 
In two recent cases, courts had the opportunity to guide future 
conflicts arising out of the intersection of postmortem publicity rights 
and federal copyright protection.  The cases involved the lucrative es-
tates of the late musician James Brown and the late actress Marilyn 
Monroe.
23
  These actions presented the courts with the opportunity to 
set influential precedent and prevent future lawsuits arising out of 
these expanding and converging rights; however, both courts were 
hesitant to directly address the issue and, in fact, opted to avoid a po-
tential resolution. 
A. Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc. 
Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc.
24
 involved the es-
tate of the late actress Marilyn Monroe.  The action arose out of a 
dispute as to whether the descendants of photographer Sam Shaw 
had the right to commercially exploit famous photographs of Mo-
nroe.
25
  During his lifetime, Shaw had captured several iconic images 
of the actress; after his death, the takers of his estate became the cop-
yright holders of such pictures.
26
  The takers of Monroe’s estate con-
tended that they alone had the right to exploit those images because 
 
 21 See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 22 See, e.g., INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, FEDERAL RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: REQUEST FOR 
ACTION BY THE INTA BOARD OF DIRECTORS (1998), http://www.inta.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=285&Itemid=153&getcontent=3. 
 23 See Goldman & Paine, supra note 5. 
 24 CMG Worldwide, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67529. 
 25 Id. at *3. 
 26 Id. at *4. 
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they owned Monroe’s right of publicity.27  Significantly, because both 
original parties were already deceased at the time, neither Monroe 
herself nor Shaw brought claims in that case.  The plaintiffs consisted 
of the family of Monroe’s acting coach, Lee Strasberg, who had come 
to inherit the residue of Monroe’s estate; they filed suit against 
Shaw’s devisees.28  CMG Worldwide, among other things, demonstrates 
the distance that can develop between the late artists and those with 
present-day financial interests in their work. 
Although the disputed issue in CMG Worldwide involved the right 
to exploit the photographs of Monroe, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York decided that the case turned on a 
choice-of-law issue.  The court reasoned that “[w]hen Marilyn Mo-
nroe died, neither New York nor California recognized any posthum-
ous right of publicity.”29  Because Monroe died in California, her es-
tate contended that California’s newly amended, retroactive right-of-
publicity law
30
 applied.
31
  A successful argument for Monroe’s estate 
would have meant that, although Monroe did not specifically be-
queath her right of publicity at the time of her death, her descendi-
ble right would be upheld and read into the residue clause of her will 
because she fell within the retroactive period of the statute. 
The court, however, found that Monroe died a domiciliary of 
New York, a state that refuses to recognize any posthumous publicity 
rights.
32
  Because New York did not recognize Monroe’s publicity 
rights in the first place, the court never properly addressed the issue 
of the postmortem right.  This finding allowed the court to resolve 
the case without confronting the overarching issue: who has a strong-
er claim to a photograph of a deceased celebrity—the copyright 
holder or the celebrity’s estate? 
B. Brown v. ACMI Pop Div. 
A case involving the estate of performer James Brown provided 
another opportunity for the judiciary to resolve competing interests 
between copyright holders of photographs of famous personalities 
 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at *6. 
 30 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West Supp. 2009); see also infra Part III.B.1.a (discuss-
ing California’s law).  
 31 CMG Worldwide, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67529, at *4. 
 32 See id. at *12. 
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and the estates of such celebrities.
33
  In Brown, the defendant was not 
actually the photographer but rather Corbis Corporation, which is 
“in the business of licensing copyrights for photographs and other ar-
tistic images.”34  Brown explained that the corporation, owned by Mi-
crosoft’s Bill Gates, “either owns the copyrights to those images or is 
authorized to license the copyright to those images on behalf of pho-
tographers and artists whom Corbis represents and to whom Corbis 
pays royalties.”35  In that case, the trial court found that Brown’s right 
of publicity was at issue because the defendant was not licensing the 
images under the fair-use doctrine
36
 but was instead licensing it to 
private or commercial users.
37
 
Although Brown ruled in favor of the plaintiff’s estate by refusing 
Corbis’s motion to dismiss, the court failed to directly address the 
complexities of the issue;
38
 however, Brown did impart some wisdom 
from which one may infer the future outcome of similar suits.  First, 
Brown applied the holding in Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.39—that state 
right-of-publicity claims are not preempted by federal copyrights un-
 
 33 See generally Brown v. ACMI Pop Div., 873 N.E.2d 954 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
 34 Id. at 956. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  The statute explains that 
the fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research, is 
not an infringement of copyright.  In determining whether the use 
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be con-
sidered shall include— 
     (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
     use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational pur 
     poses; 
     (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
     (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
     the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
     (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
     the copyrighted work.   
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair 
use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
Id. 
 37 Brown, 873 N.E.2d at 956–57; see 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/5 (West, Wes-
tlaw through P.A. 96-155 of the 2009 Reg. Sess.) (defining “commercial purpose” as 
“the public use or holding out of an individual’s identity (i) on or in connection with 
the offering for sale or sale of a product, merchandise, goods, or services; (ii) for 
purposes of advertising or promoting products, merchandise, goods, or services; or 
(iii) for the purpose of fundraising”). 
 38 See Brown, 873 N.E.2d at 963. 
 39 406 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2005). 
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der the Supremacy Clause
40—to a postmortem right-of-publicity 
claim.
41
  In Toney, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the subject matter of a right-of-publicity claim is not a 
specific photograph but the “persona of the plaintiff as a human be-
ing.”42  The court determined that the plaintiff’s identity was not 
“‘fixed in a tangible medium of expression’ and that the rights pro-
tected by the [Illinois Right of] Publicity Act are not ‘equivalent’ to 
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope . . . of the Copy-
right Act.”43  Thus, the state publicity law protecting one’s persona 
was not preempted.
44
  Brown’s application of Toney illustrates the judi-
ciary’s unwillingness to allow copyright to necessarily preempt post-
mortem publicity rights.  Second, Brown implied that in situations 
where the copyright holder possesses and licenses images of deceased 
personalities in an intangible medium, such as the Internet, courts 
should look to the potential end user to see whether the result will be 
a fixed work of tangible use subject to right-of-publicity laws.
45
  Brown 
did not, however, decide which claim was stronger and why and, thus, 
provided little guidance for subsequent courts to which the issue is 
presented. 
III. THE STATE-CREATED RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
A celebrity’s right of publicity46 is designed to protect against the 
loss of financial opportunities by the celebrity if her persona is ex-
ploited commercially.
47
  Publicity rights differ from privacy rights, 
 
 40 Id. at 910. 
 41 Brown, 873 N.E.2d at 963. 
 42 Id. at 962 (quoting Toney, 406 F.2d at 908). 
 43 Id. at 962–63 (quoting Toney, 406 F.3d at 909). 
 44 Id. at 963. 
 45 Id. 
 46 The right of publicity is not restricted to celebrities; however, lawsuits generally 
arise “when famous celebrities bring action for liability or damage against advertisers 
or merchandisers of products for including messages that bear some representation 
of their public image.”  Michael Einhom, Publicity Rights, Merchandising and Economic 
Reasoning, 23 ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Fall 2005, at 1, 1.  This Comment focuses on cele-
brities’ rights, although the majority of its analysis may be applied generally to the 
right of publicity. 
 47 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).  Zacchini 
described the reasons for protecting property rights: 
The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the straight-
forward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. 
No social purpose is served by having the defendant get free some as-
pect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he 
would normally pay. 
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protections against false endorsement, and placing in a false light,
48
 
each of which was devised to prevent an individual from suffering 
mental anguish.
49
  Presently, about forty states recognize publicity 
rights either by common law or by statute.
50
  Because of the state-
created nature of the tort, however, what may be protected in one 
state may not be protected in another.
51
 
A. History of Publicity Rights 
The right of publicity, born out of the right of privacy,
52
 has 
evolved throughout state common law since 1953
53
 and is defined as 
the “right of every human being to control the unauthorized use of 
his or her name, likeness or other index of personal identity for pur-
poses of trade.”54  The term was so dubbed in the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit decision Haelan Laboratories v. Topps 
Chewing Gum,
55
 in which the court held that an individual “has a right 
in the publicity value of his photograph.”56  In that case, two rival 
chewing gum manufacturers disputed the right of an individual base-
ball player to lend exclusive rights to one of the companies to issue 
his card.
57
  The court opined that prominent persons, such as profes-
sional baseball players, deserve to be compensated when their images 
 
Id. (alteration in original) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 48 Id. at 573. 
 49 See id. (“The interest protected in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff 
in a false light is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress 
as in defamation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lugosi v. Universal 
Pictures (Lugosi II), 603 P.2d 425, 438–39 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (opin-
ing that “the gravamen of the harm flowing from an unauthorized commercial use of 
a prominent individual’s likeness in most cases is the loss of potential financial gain, 
not mental anguish”). 
 50 See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 6:3 (2d ed. 
2008).  
 51 PublicDomainSherpa.com, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, 
http://www.publicdomainsherpa.com/rights-of-publicity-and-privacy.html (last vi-
sited Feb. 3, 2010). 
 52 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46(b) (1995) (explaining 
that “[t]he principal historical antecedent of the right of publicity is the right of pri-
vacy”). 
 53 See generally Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 
866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 54 Einhom, supra note 46, at 1 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 46 (1995)). 
 55 Topps, 202 F.2d at 868. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 867.   
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and personas are used to advertise or sell products.
58
  The court rec-
ognized that celebrities, because of their social influence and associa-
tive value,
59
 needed a way to prohibit others from using their like-
nesses without just compensation.
60
  The court reasoned that without 
the ability to prevent others from exploiting their persona, celebri-
ties’ ability to profit from the grant would be severely diminished.61 
Within a year of the Topps decision, Melville Nimmer published 
the seminal article The Right of Publicity, further sculpting the newly 
recognized right.
62
  Nimmer defined the right of publicity as “the 
right to reap and control the commercial value of one’s identity for 
advertising and other commercial purposes and the related right to 
stop others from exploiting the same.”63  The article additionally as-
serted that previously accepted privacy-based models were deficient 
for several reasons
64
 and that publicity rights, therefore, should be in-
dependent and descendible property rights.
65
  Nimmer proffered that 
publicity rights should be freely assignable property rights, and he fo-
cused on a recognized persona’s financial value.66 
 
 58 Id. at 868.  
 59 See Tan, supra note 4, at 920 (describing how publicity rights have “grown out 
of the commercial reality of the burgeoning ‘associative value’ that celebrities impose 
upon products and services”); see also J. Thomas McCarthy, Professor of Law, Univ. of 
San Francisco, The Spring 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture at Columbia University 
School of Law—The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity 
(Mar. 9, 1995), in 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129, 133 (1995). 
 60 Topps, 202 F.2d at 868. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 
(1954). 
 63 Einhom, supra note 46, at 23 (citing Melville, supra note 62, at 215–18). 
 64 These reasons could be characterized as follows: 
[F]irst, in order to retain pecuniary value, the right of publicity must 
be assignable; second, there should be a cause of action regardless of 
whether the likeness was used in an offensive manner; third, damages 
ought to be computed in terms of the value of the publicity to the de-
fendant, rather then [sic] the injury to the plaintiff; and fourth, that 
no waiver of this right should occur because one becomes a well-known 
personality. 
John C. Fuller, Case Note, Like a Candle in the Wind: Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. 
CMG Worldwide, Inc. and the Flickering Recognition of Marilyn Monroe’s Right of Publicity 
in New York, 15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 299, 310 (2008).  
 65 Nimmer, supra note 62, at 216. 
 66 Id. (explaining that “in most instances a person achieves publicity values of 
substantial pecuniary worth only after he has expended considerable time, effort, 
skill, and even money”). 
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Subsequent to the publication of Nimmer’s article, William 
Prosser authored an influential law review article
67
 that categorized 
privacy rights into four separate torts: 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his 
private affairs. 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plain-
tiff. 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public 
eye. 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s 
name or likeness.
68
 
This fourth tort, although not directly labeled a publicity right, 
does resemble the idea of one.
69
  The American Law Institute found 
Prosser’s distinctions so plausible that they adopted his ideas for the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts.
70
  Both Nimmer’s and Prosser’s works led 
to the currently accepted concept of the “right of publicity” found in 
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.
71
  With the foundation 
laid for states to recognize a right of publicity, implementation de-
pended upon state legislatures codifying the right. 
B. The Postmortem Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity, although only recognized over the past 
fifty-five years,
72
 is under continuous development.  Because it is an 
evolving area of state law, controversy often arises as to its implemen-
tation and recognition.
73
  The right of publicity’s evolution, from its 
 
 67 See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
 68 Id. at 389.  
 69 See MCCARTHY, supra note 50, §§ 1:3, :23.  Prosser’s “appropriation” tort differs 
from publicity rights because the right of publicity can be considered an assignable 
property right rather than a personal interest.  Id. § 5:65, :67.  Also, when calculating 
damages, courts determine the harm by examining injury to the plaintiff’s feelings or 
psyche in “appropriation” cases, whereas in right-of-publicity cases, courts measure 
harm in terms of the value of the enrichment to the defendant.  Id. § 5:63. 
 70 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B–E (1977). 
 71 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46(b) (1995). 
 72 The term “right of publicity” was first coined in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 73 See Craig Miller, Craig’s Corner for Counsel: Right of Publicity, METROPOLITAN 
CORP. COUNS., Sept. 2008, at 4, 4, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/ 
pdf/2008/September/04.pdf.  Mark Lee, a partner at Manatt, Phelps and Phillips, 
LLP in Los Angeles, stated the following: 
The fact that [the right of publicity] is governed by state law makes it 
an especially complex area   . . . . I’ve called the present state law re-
gime a crazy quilt of inconsistent laws that make it very difficult for 
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birth in privacy law to its current status as an independently recog-
nized property right,
74
 naturally led to questions regarding the rights 
of deceased individuals.
75
  In Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.,
76
 the wi-
dows of comedic actors Laurel and Hardy sued the copyright owners 
of particular Laurel and Hardy films for misappropriating the names 
and likenesses of the two deceased comedians for commercial gain.
77
  
Price explained the justification of a postmortem right of publicity as 
serving the financial interests associated with property rights, as op-
posed to certain privacy rights’ protection of one’s feelings, which 
naturally expire at death.
78
  The court opined that the defendant’s 
copyright was in the films themselves and not in the comedians’ 
names and likenesses.
79
 
A key distinction drawn in Price was between personality and 
property rights.  Treating one’s persona or likeness as property, 
which is freely alienable and inheritable, potentially allows for the 
right to survive the loss of the celebrity itself.  The first case to ac-
knowledge a descendible right of publicity was Lugosi v. Universal Pic-
tures (Lugosi I).
80
  In that case, the widow and son of Bela Lugosi, who 
 
third parties to know what they can do, and for rights holders to know 
what they can stop. 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 74 See Reeves v. United Artists, 572 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (com-
paring the non-descendible right of privacy and the descendible right of publicity). 
 75 See MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 9:18.  Nineteen states have statutes that specifi-
cally acknowledge the publicity rights of the deceased.  Lawrence J. Siskind, Regene-
rating the Rights of the Living Dead, LAW.COM, May 11, 2009, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/legaltechnology/pubArticleLT.jsp?id=1202430564207.  
Five states have also recognized a common-law postmortem right of publicity, includ-
ing: Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, New Jersey, and Utah.  MCCARTHY, supra note 
50, at §§ 9:21, :23, :27, :30, :37. 
 76 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 77 Id. at 837–38. 
 78 Id. at 844.  Because the right of publicity is proprietary in nature, 
[w]hen determining the scope of the right of publicity . . . one must 
take into account the purely commercial nature of the protected right. 
. . . There appears to be no logical reason to terminate this right upon 
death of the person protected.  It is for this reason, presumably, that 
this publicity right has been deemed a “property right.” 
Id.  
 79 Id. 
 80 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972), rev’d, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).  
See David R. Ginsburg, Comment, Transfer of the Right of Publicity: Dracula’s Progeny and 
Privacy’s Stepchild, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1103, 1113–17 (1975) (providing an in-depth dis-
cussion of Lugosi I). 
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played the title role in the 1931 film Dracula,
81
 sued the studio in the 
Southern District of New York to recover profits derived from the use 
of Lugosi’s likeness for a variety of merchandise.82 
At trial, the Lugosi I. court relied on Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.
83
 and held that the right of publicity did not 
end at Lugosi’s death; thus, the actor’s beneficiaries were allowed to 
recover.
84
  On appeal, the California Supreme Court examined the 
difficulty in determining when a deceased personality enters into the 
public domain and who should draw the line.
85
  The court concluded 
that the right of publicity was non-descendible and ended with the 
death of the actor.
86
  Lugosi II did imply, however, that had Lugosi 
exploited his name, likeness, or identity as Dracula for commercial 
purposes while living, he would have created a descendible property 
right under California common law.
87
  The court reasoned that allow-
ing a descendible publicity right of a deceased personality who never 
 
 81 DRACULA (Universal Pictures 1931). 
 82 Lugosi I, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 541. 
 83 Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
 84 Lugosi I, 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 555. 
 85 The California Supreme Court noted the following: 
If the opportunities of a person to exploit a name or likeness in one’s 
lifetime are inheritable property, may it be assumed that if the first 
heirs thereof, like their immediate ancestor, do not exploit similar op-
portunities the right to do so is automatically transferred to succeeding 
heirs? . . . If not, where is the line to be drawn, and who should draw it? 
Assuming that some durational limitation would be appropriate, it has 
been suggested that the adoption of such a limitation would be 
“beyond the scope of judicial authority,” and that “legislative action will 
be required . . . .” 
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures (Lugosi II), 603 P.2d 425, 430 (Cal. 1979). 
 86 Id. at 431 n.8. 
 87 Id. at 429; see also id. at 432–33 (Mosk, J., concurring).  Justice Mosk reasoned 
that Bela Lugosi was not entitled to publicity rights as Dracula because he was merely 
an actor in the film and had therefore contracted away his rights to the studio; how-
ever, in cases where the character is the creation of the actor portraying him, such as 
in Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F.Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the publicity right 
would be protected.  Lugosi II, 603 P.2d at 432–33 (Mosk, J., concurring).  But see id. 
at 445 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).  Chief Justice Bird contends that although many men 
have portrayed the character Dracula, Universal 
sought to capitalize on the particular image of Lugosi in this portrayal 
of Count Dracula and the public recognition generated by his perfor-
mance.  Such use is illustrative of the very interests the right of publici-
ty is intended to protect.  Hence, Lugosi had a protectable property in-
terest in controlling unauthorized commercial exploitation of his 
likeness in his portrayal of Count Dracula.  
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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exploited his right while alive neither serves society’s interest in the 
free dissemination of ideas nor the artist’s rights to the fruits of his 
own labor.
88
  The Lugosi cases, and others like them, demonstrate the 
clarity that state legislation honed specifically at postmortem-publicity 
rights can provide for estates. 
Although the right of publicity is derived from the common law, 
several states have ratified legislation recognizing a postmortem right 
of publicity.
89
  Because the right of publicity is a property right and is 
therefore determined by the individual states, each state recognizes 
the deceased’s right for varying lengths of time.90  This disparity 
breeds controversy in determining which state’s law to apply91 be-
cause of the potential favorability of certain forums.  Wisconsin, for 
example, does not recognize any right of publicity,
92
 whereas Tennes-
see recognizes the postmortem right as long as the deceased’s heirs 
continue to exploit it.
93
  Therefore, celebrities’ estates would likely 
prefer to bring publicity actions in forums such as Tennessee rather 
than those like Wisconsin.  A nationally accepted rule would help 
curb forum shopping. 
The significance of a state’s recognition of a postmortem right 
and its duration is considerable when examining the potential of 
one’s economic value as a celebrity.94  In an instance where the right 
to capitalize on the celebrity’s name and likeness expires upon death, 
the value to any one individual trying to exploit it severely diminishes 
and is instead spread thinly among any and all who choose to pursue 
it. 
 
 88 Id. at 431 (majority opinion).  These appear to be two of the major policy rea-
sons for recognition of a descendible right of publicity. 
 89 See MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 9:18 (explaining that nineteen states officially 
recognize a postmortem right). 
 90 Id.  
 91 See supra Part II (discussing Brown v. ACMI Pop Div., 873 N.E.2d 954 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2007) and Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 3939 
(CM), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67529 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2008)). 
 92 See MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 9:40. 
 93 TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1104 (LEXIS through 2008 Regular Sess.).  Tennes-
see allows the estate ten years to decide whether to use the deceased’s identity com-
mercially, at which time the estate’s right either expires if unused or continues inde-
finitely if exploited.  Id. 
 94 See Goldman & Paine, supra note 5 (noting that James Brown’s estate grossed 
five million dollars in 2007). 
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C. Current Significant State Statutes 
Although many states recognize an individual’s right of publici-
ty, examining the current status of postmortem rights in specific 
states facilitates an understanding of recent trends.
95
  Presently, states 
generally prefer to adopt stronger legislation in favor of celebrity 
rights both during life and after death.
96
  Although certain states have 
recently denied campaigns to recognize a descendible right of public-
ity, such action seems to be the exception rather than the rule.
97
  Be-
cause photographers’ rights98 are well established in the Copyright 
Clause,
99
 the protection afforded to public personalities by the sepa-
rate states will often determine the success of right-of-publicity claims.  
The following states’ publicity rights statutes have each played a role 
in the litigation of both James Brown’s and Marilyn Monroe’s estates.  
Each example, while taking a different approach to publicity rights, 
represents the variety of legislation found throughout the states. 
1. California 
California has a statutory right of publicity
100
 with one of the 
more aggressive postmortem-recognition clauses in the country.
101
  
 
 95 See MCCARTHY, supra note 50. 
 96 See infra Part III.B.1.a (discussing California’s statute); see also Anthony V. Lupo 
& Sarah L. Bruno, Washington State Amends Right to Publicity Statute, ARENT FOX LLP, 
Mar. 26, 2008, http://www.arentfox.com/publications/index.cfm?fa= 
legalUpdateDisp&content_id=1535 (discussing Washington’s recent amendments to 
the Washington Personality Rights Act). 
 97 See infra Part III.B.1.d (discussing New York’s decision not to pass publicity 
rights legislation). 
 98 For the purposes of this Comment, photographers’ rights are meant to also 
include photographers’ estates and any copyright holders of an image. 
 99 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
 100 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West Supp. 2010) (defining California’s right of pub-
licity). 
 101 See id. § 3344.1(b).  California’s law explains that publicity rights are 
freely transferable or descendible, in whole or in part . . . .  [Publicity 
rights] shall be deemed to have existed at the time of death of any de-
ceased personality who died prior to January 1, 1985, and . . . shall vest 
in the persons entitled to these property rights under the testamentary 
instrument of the deceased personality effective as of the date of his or 
her death. 
Id.  See also Laura Hock, Comment, What’s in a Name? Fred Goldman’s Quest to Acquire 
O.J. Simpson’s Right of Publicity and the Suit’s Implications for Celebrities, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 
347, 369–70 (2008) (providing a detailed discussion of California’s statutory right of 
publicity). 
INGLES (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  1:25 PM 
326 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:311 
 
The state’s strong ties to the film industry were certainly a chief con-
sideration behind the legislation.  In 1984, California passed legisla-
tion guaranteeing its movie stars postmortem publicity rights; addi-
tionally, the California legislature voted to “clarify” the statute in 
2007, purporting to make it apply retroactively.
102
  The act, which 
took effect on January 1, 2008, determined that the assignable right 
applied retroactively to any individual who died in the seventy years 
prior to the statutes’ initial enactment in 1985.103  This retroactive ap-
plication, in addition to the seventy-year postmortem recognition,
104
 
demonstrates California’s intent both to set the bar in terms of com-
prehensive protection for the individual and to protect Hollywood’s 
earning potential.
105
 
2. Indiana 
Indiana’s statutory protection of publicity rights106 is perhaps 
even more celebrity-friendly than California’s.  The right of publicity 
may be asserted either by the personality or by “a person to whom the 
recognized rights of a personality have been transferred.”107  The sta-
tute protects essentially any violation of one’s right of publicity that 
occurs within the state, regardless of where the violation occurs or 
 
 102 Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 3939 (CM), 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67529, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2008). 
 103 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(h) (West Supp. 2009).  The statute explains that  
“deceased personality” means any natural person whose name, voice, 
signature, photograph, or likeness has commercial value at the time of 
his or her death, whether or not during the lifetime of that natural 
person the person used his or her name, voice, signature, photograph, 
or likeness on or in products, merchandise or goods, or for purposes 
of advertising or selling, or solicitation of purchase of, products, mer-
chandise, goods, or services. A “deceased personality” shall include, 
without limitation, any such natural person who has died within 70 
years prior to January 1, 1985. 
Id. 
 104 Id. § 3344.1(g) (stating that “[n]o action shall be brought under this section by 
reason of any use of a deceased personality’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or 
likeness occurring after the expiration of [seventy] years after the death of the de-
ceased personality”). 
 105 See 2007 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 439 (Deering) (explaining that the California 
Legislature’s intent, when passing the 2007 amendments to California’s right-of-
publicity statute, was to nullify the two summary-judgment rulings against the holders 
of Marilyn Monroe’s right of publicity in that year). 
 106 IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-1 (LEXIS through 2009 First Regular Sess. and Spe-
cial Sess.) (outlining Indiana’s publicity rights). 
 107 Id. § 32-36-1-17. 
INGLES (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  1:25 PM 
2010] COMMENT 327 
 
where the personality is domiciled.
108
  Indiana’s statute preserves 
one’s right for 100 years after death.109 
3. Illinois 
Illinois had no common-law right of publicity, but in 1999, the Il-
linois legislature passed the Right of Publicity Act, which statutorily 
granted the right.
110
  This right is descendible
111
 for fifty years after the 
celebrity’s death.112  The statute focuses on the commercial purpose 
of the use of the image to determine potential violations of one’s 
publicity rights.
113
  The Illinois State Legislature is contemplating, 
however, amending its statute to “allow companies to sell license 
rights to images without being liable for customers’ illegal use of 
those images.”114  If amended, this change would benefit companies 
that license images to various sources, such as Bill Gates’s Corbis 
Corporation,
115
 which is based in Chicago.
116
  Illinois’s legislative in-
terests
117
 seem to contrast with those of California.
118
  These two states’ 
handling of publicity rights illustrates the power that lobbyists’ inter-
 
 108 Id. § 32-36-1-1; see also Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. 
05 Civ. 3939 (CM), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67529, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2008).  
The Shaw court noted the breadth of Indiana’s law:  
Indiana’s 1994 Right of Publicity Act . . . . passed over three decades af-
ter Ms. Monroe’s death, by a state with which she had (as far as the 
court is aware) absolutely no contact during her life, creates a descend-
ible and freely transferable right of publicity that survives for 100 years 
after a personality’s death.  The statute purports to apply to an act or 
event that occurs within Indiana, regardless of a personality’s domicile, 
residence, or citizenship. 
CMG Worldwide, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67529, at *7–8.  
 109 IND. CODE ANN. § 32-36-1-7 (LEXIS through 2009 First Regular Sess. and Spe-
cial Sess.). 
 110 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/1–60 (LEXIS through Public Acts 96-338, 96-
439, 96-454, 96-552, and 96-709 of the 2009 Sess.). 
 111 See id. § 1075/15. 
 112 See id. § 1075/30(b). 
 113 See id. § 1075/10; see also supra note 37 (defining “commercial purpose”). 
 114 John T. Brooks & Taylor Corbitt, Celebrity Estates Face Off with Publicity Laws, TR. 
& ESTATES, June 19, 2008, http://trustsandestates.com/fiduciary/famous_die_who_ 
profits_0619/index.html. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. (explaining that Corbis sells licenses to its more than 100 million images 
online, including those of celebrities, without warning consumers that using them 
commercially requires additional licensing). 
 117 Id. 
 118 See 2007 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 439 (Deering).  
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ests can play in legislative decision making as opposed to legislatures 
relying on equitable considerations. 
4. New York 
New York, like California, is home to numerous celebrities and 
personalities; however, it is one of only a small number of states that 
expressly denies individuals any descendible right of publicity.
119
  New 
York’s struggle with publicity rights also has allowed for strong lobby-
ing efforts on both sides of the issue.
120
  Although New York recogniz-
es a right of privacy, this right ends abruptly upon one’s death be-
cause it is not a property right.
121
  Today’s celebrities would better 
serve their heirs economically by living in a state like California, 
where the publicity right’s holder could continue to turn a postmor-
tem profit, as compared to New York, where the deceased personality 
would instantly enter the public domain.
122
 
IV. FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAW 
Copyright, designated in title 17 of the United States Code,
123
 
protects authors of published or unpublished original works, includ-
 
 119 See Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 586 (2d. Cir. 1990) (denying that 
there is a New York common-law right of publicity); see also Price v. Hal Roach Stu-
dios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).  The Price court described the lack 
of publicity rights in New York and stated that “there is a statutory right which pro-
tects living persons from commercial exploitation of their names and pictures by 
others without their written consent.  This statutory right . . . is predicated upon the 
classic right of privacy’s theoretical basis which is to prevent injury to feelings.”  Price, 
400 F. Supp. at 843. 
 120 See Mark G. Tratos & Stephen Wiezencker, Dead Celebrity Wars, 25 ENT. & 
SPORTS LAW., Summer 2007, at 1, 17.  Many high-profile names have been associated 
with lobbying efforts: 
In support of the legislation, groups like the Screen Actors Guild and 
individual celebrities such as Al Pacino, Yoko Ono, and Liza Minnelli, 
plus the representatives of the estates of musician [Jimi] Hendrix and 
the estates of baseball greats Babe Ruth, Jackie Robinson, Lou [Ge-
hrig], and Mickey Mantle, have come out to support legislative efforts 
to reverse the adverse court decisions. Opposing the legislation are 
powerful interests such as the New York Newspaper Publishers Associa-
tion and the estates of many now-deceased photographers. 
Id. 
 121 See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 (McKinney 1992). 
 122 See, e.g., Shaw Family Archives Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 3939 
(CM), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67529 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2008) (detailing the financial 
consequences to Marilyn Monroe’s estate after the court found in that case that Mo-
nroe was domiciled in New York at the time of her death rather than in California). 
 123 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006). 
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ing, “literary, dramatic, musical, artistic, and certain other intellectual 
works.”124  Copyright law requires the permission of the copyright 
owner to “reproduc[e], distribut[e], broadcast[], publicly display[] 
or publicly perform[]” copyrighted or derivative works.125  Copyright 
law does permit, however, certain uses to qualify for the Fair Use Doc-
trine, which is an affirmative defense to copyright violations.
126
  Copy-
right law is not meant to protect an author’s ideas; it is meant only to 
protect the author’s expression of them.127  Ideas are meant to be 
freely disseminated and remain in the public domain regardless of 
the copyright protection afforded to their more tangible expres-
sions.
128
 
Originally, the Copyright Act was very strict in its application, 
covering only maps, charts, and books.
129
  In addition, protection was 
only granted to American authors who appropriately registered and 
deposited their works, giving them “an exclusive right over printing, 
reprinting, publishing, and vending only.”130  If registered, an au-
thor’s work was protected for only fourteen years and was renewable 
once if the author was alive at the expiration of the initial protec-
tion.
131
 
Copyright law was designed “to promote the progress of science” 
by granting authors “exclusive rights” for “limited times.”132  Tradi-
 
 124 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT BASICS, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/ 
circ1.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2009).  
 125 See Mark H. Wittow & Martin L. Stern, User-Generated Videos Online Raise Vexing 
Issues, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 13, 2008, at S4, available at 10/13/2008 Nat’l L.J. S4, (Col. 1) 
(West). 
 126 See supra note 36.     
 127 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985); 
see also Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension 
Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 149 (2002) (explaining that “[i]n dealing with copy-
righted material, the law of copyright only protects the expression of ideas and not 
the ideas themselves”). 
 128 See Epstein, supra note 127, at 149. 
 129 See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 16, § 1.08[B] (describing the original Cop-
yright Act). 
 130 Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch., Dunwoody Lecture at 
the University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law: The Creative Commons 
(Apr. 26, 2002), in 55 FLA. L. REV. 763, 768–69 (2003) (discussing the history of copy-
right). 
 131 Id. 
 132 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stan-
ford Law Sch., Melville B. Nimmer Memorial Lecture at UCLA: Copyright’s First 
Amendment, (Mar. 1, 2001), in 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1062 (2001) (discussing the 
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tionally, the most significant constitutional hurdle to overcome to re-
ceive copyright protection was to qualify one’s work as a “writing.”133  
The Supreme Court, in an effort to clarify an otherwise vague term, 
found that “‘writings’ . . . may be interpreted to include any physical 
rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”134  
Courts have subsequently engaged, almost universally, in a liberal 
construction of “writings.”135  For example, under section 102 of the 
current Copyright Act,
136
 even pantomimes are eligible for copyright 
protection provided their work is silent and dramatic.
137
  The qualifi-
cations of “writings” are meant to evolve with the times rather than to 
be restricted to interpretations available at the time of enactment.
138
 
A. History of Photographic Copyright Law 
The invention of photography caused difficulty in copyright 
law.
139
  The dispute stemmed from the issue of whether a photograph 
merely captured a non-copyrightable idea or whether, by making that 
idea tangible, the photographer created a work capable of being co-
pyrighted.
140
  Unsurprisingly, a professional photographer would ar-
gue that his vision and application is as much art and authorship as 
that of a painter.  The argument could be presented, however, that 
the true art is the subject of the photograph, which is not of the pho-
tographer’s creation.  “Where creativity refers to the nature of the 
work itself, originality refers to the nature of the author’s contribu-
tion to the work.”141  The issue turns on whether the photographer 
makes enough of an original contribution to his photography. 
 
original duration of copyright compared to the current liberal construction of the 
phrase “for limited times”). 
 133 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 16, § 1.08[A]. 
 134 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). 
 135 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 16, § 1.08 (describing the liberal construction 
of “writings”). 
 136 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 137 See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 16, § 2.07. 
 138 Reiss v. Nat’l Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (explain-
ing the Copyright Clause’s evolution in that its “grants of power to Congress com-
promise, not only what was then known, but what the ingenuity of men should devise 
thereafter”). 
 139 See Bernard Edelman, The Law’s Eye: Nature and Copyright, in OF AUTHORS AND 
ORIGINS: ESSAYS ON COPYRIGHT LAW 79, 84–85 (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowel eds., 
1994). 
 140 See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 16, § 2.08[E]. 
 141 Id. § 2.08. 
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The Supreme Court addressed the issue in Burrow-Giles Litho-
graphic Co. v. Sarony
142
 and held that a photographed portrait of Oscar 
Wilde
143
 was considered a writing for copyright purposes.
144
  This deci-
sion did not, however, address the status of more everyday photo-
graphs, which have subsequently been found to be “writings” as 
well.
145
  The debate as to whether a photograph is a writing was put to 
rest by the adoption of section 102(a)(5) of the Copyright Act,
146
 
which definitively classifies photographs as writings.
147
  “The Copy-
right Act does not contain a definition of a photograph, but subject 
to the fixation requirement, it would appear to include any product 
of the photographic process, whether in print or negative form, in-
cluding filmstrips, slide films and individual slides.”148 
B. The Copyright Extension Act 
Similar to the right of publicity,
149
 the recent trend in copyright 
law has been to lengthen copyright terms to provide protection after 
the author’s death.  The original length of a copyright was one four-
teen-year term with the potential for authors still living at the time of 
expiration to obtain a reversion for an additional fourteen years.
150
  
These relatively strict copyright lives were meant to serve the function 
granted by the phrase “for limited times”151 found in the Copyright 
Clause. 
Beginning in 1962, however, Congress began to enact increa-
singly longer extensions of the terms for existing copyrights.
152
  These 
extensions began as brief one or two-year expansions, but those small 
 
 142 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
 143 See generally The Official Web Site of Oscar Wilde, http://www.cmgww.com/ 
historic/wilde/bio1.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2009) (explaining Wilde’s celebrity). 
 144 Sarony, 111 U.S. at 60. 
 145 See Jewelers’ Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 274 F. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 
1921), aff’d, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922); see also Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 
F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).  Photographs do not need a great amount of inven-
tiveness to suffice as a writing.  For example, a professional photographer’s product 
photos of a vodka company’s bottle were found to be subject to copyright protection.  
See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, 225 F.3d 1068, 1081 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 146 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2006). 
 147 Id.; see also 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 16, § 2.08. 
 148 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 16, § 2.08. 
 149 See supra Part III.B (discussing postmortem right-of-publicity trends). 
 150 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 16, § 9.01. 
 151 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 152 See Lessig, supra note 130, at 764. 
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incremental increases have given way to much larger ones.
153
  The 
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
154
 lengthened the term of 
copyrights by twenty years.
155
 Currently, copyrights extend for the au-
thor’s life plus seventy years—five times that of the original act.156  
Unlike the postmortem publicity rights statutes in states like Califor-
nia, however, these copyright extensions apply only to future copy-
rights and to those still in effect at the time of passage, not to those 
that have already lapsed.
157
  Opponents of broad copyright protection 
submit that now, the images that a young photographer takes of an 
older celebrity could remain out of the public domain for close to 
150 years.
158
  Because relatively few celebrities remain in the spotlight 
for six or seven generations, their actual fans and other artists are 
likely left perpetually without unrestricted access to these images.  Al-
though it is argued that increased access to copyrighted images pro-
motes creativity throughout the artistic community, the seventy-year 
delay in access following a photographer’s death severely limits the 
relevance of the celebrity and therefore his creative inspirational 
worth.
159
 
Copyright law’s limited grant requirement has been touted as a 
means to foster creativity.
160
  Potential authors who have the ability to 
create works that will be protected for long periods of time are re-
 
 153 Id. 
 154 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 
102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 155 Id.; see also Lessig, supra note 130, at 764.  See generally Epstein, supra note 127 
(discussing the extension of copyright terms to seventy years after the author’s death 
by the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act). 
 156 See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act; see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra  note 16, § 9.01 (stating that “[p]re-existing works that had not yet entered the 
public domain, in addition, are now potentially accorded ninety-five years of protec-
tion”). 
 157 See Epstein, supra note 127, at 124; see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 16, § 
9.01 (discussing the disparity in protection of copyrighted work depending on when 
the work was created, stating that “[s]uccessive lengthening of the period of protec-
tion leaves works subject to disparate terms, depending on when they were created in 
relation to the schemes later adopted during the period of their protection”). 
 158 See generally Lessig, supra note 130. 
 159 See id. at 764 (discussing the creative detriment imposed by the increased 
length of copyright protection). 
 160 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[T]he 
limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved.  It is 
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of 
a special reward . . . .”); see also Epstein, supra note 127, at 126 (explaining the relev-
ance of the fixed-duration copyright protection).  
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warded with economic incentives to create.
161
  The logic behind this 
theory is that shorter protection periods would not be worth the time 
and energy needed to create, whereas longer periods allow more 
time for the author to exclusively derive income from his work.
162
 
Like publicity rights, copyright law also has had lobbies of public 
personalities and well-known entities on both sides of the duration 
issue.
163
  Additionally, although no one debates the necessity of au-
thors’ postmortem copyrights, disagreement continues in regard to 
what really is the optimal duration.
164
  Because of the “for limited 
times” requirement, the duration must be definite;165 however, the 
optimal length likely depends on whatever length best “promote[s] 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”166 
V. RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN  
POSTMORTEM PUBLICITY RIGHTS AND COPYRIGHT 
If anything is clear with regard to the current status of postmor-
tem right-of-publicity claimants and posthumous celebrity-
photographic copyright-holder clashes, it is the lack of national cer-
tainty and clarity.  Although state legislatures would likely favor pub-
 
 161 Epstein, supra note 127, at 126. 
 162 Epstein explains both the encouragement for the creator and drawback to the 
creative public that copyright provides: 
[A] copyright works like a property right: the longer period of exclusiv-
ity increases the incentive to create the invention or writing in the first 
place. Unfortunately, on the downside, a copyright works like a legal 
monopoly: it restricts dissemination after creation, because the copy-
right or patent holder will charge some fee for the use of the writing or 
invention. 
Id.  
 163 This includes the late singer Sonny Bono and The Walt Disney Corporation.  
Lawrence Lessig, Op-Ed., Let the Stories Go, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2001, at A19, available 
at 2001 WLNR 3338543. 
 164 See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Debate to Intensify on Copyright Extension Law, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 7, 2002, at C1, available at 2002 WLNR 4444442. 
 165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  California Congresswoman Mary Bono, however, 
while speaking about her late husband, for whom the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act is named, stated the following: 
Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever.  I am in-
formed by staff that such a change would violate the Constitution. . . .  
As you know, there is also [then-MPAA president] Jack Valenti’s pro-
posal for term to last forever less one day.  Perhaps the Committee may 
look at that next Congress. 
144 CONG. REC. 24,336 (1998) (statement of Rep. Bono).   
 166 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
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licity rights over copyrights,
167
 the issue is moot because copyright is 
constitutionally derived.
168
  Uncertainty remains as to whether Con-
gress will ever consider addressing the right of publicity at the federal 
level.  Although Congress looks favorably upon copyright holders,
169
 
arguing that Congress would favor copyright over publicity rights 
would be too speculative because the latter has never been addressed.  
Courts can try their hands at legislating from the bench, but a survey 
of recent case law demonstrates that judges are categorically disin-
clined to do so.
170
  The Supreme Court has never granted certiorari 
on the issue, and lower courts prefer circumventing the conflict ra-
ther than directly addressing it.  Some contend that extension of the 
Copyright Act simply “pads the wealth of the widows and children of 
the original copyright holders.”171  A parallel argument can be made 
against celebrity estates.  Perhaps the question turns on whose heirs 
are more deserving of the economic benefits derived from the work.  
By examining the reasoning of both sides, the most equitable solu-
tion may be to favor one group while allowing the other to exercise a 
check on its use. 
A.Why Is That Photograph Valuable? 
Celebrities’ estates are concerned with preventing the unjust 
enrichment of the photographers’ estates.172  The reason that a pho-
tograph of a deceased celebrity tends to retain value, and therefore 
create demand, is because the image is of the celebrity, rather than a 
more “regular” person.173  Undoubtedly, the value of a copyrighted 
photograph of a landscape or piece of architecture belongs to the 
 
 167 See supra Part III. 
 168 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 169 In light of the continued extension of copyright duration, the congressional 
trend seems to support stronger copyright protection. 
 170 See supra Part II. 
 171 Epstein, supra note 127, at 128 (discussing generally Copyright Term, Film Labe-
ling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th 
Cong. (1996)). 
 172 See generally Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573–76 
(1977). 
 173 This may not be the case in a limited number of instances involving photo-
graphers who are celebrities in their own right, such as Andy Warhol.  Warhol’s 
silkscreen images of Marilyn Monroe, however, are a strong example of the creativity 
that could potentially flow from current artists’ ability to access copyrighted photo-
graphy.  See generally Web Exhibits, Andy Warhol’s Marilyn Prints, 
http://www.webexhibits.org/colorart/marilyns.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2009).  
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photographer.  The persona captured in the photograph of a celebri-
ty, however, is precisely the thing that a right of publicity is designed 
to protect.  Allowing a photographer’s heirs to profit from the good-
will created by, and to the exclusion of, a celebrity after she has 
passed hardly seems just. 
B. Lockean Labor Considerations 
Perhaps, from a Lockean standpoint,
174
 because a celebrity has 
put forth the effort to hone his craft and increase his recognition 
during life, he should reap those rewards even after his death.
175
  In 
the case of someone like James Brown, who presumably worked very 
hard to perfect his craft, for someone like Bill Gates to profit from 
Brown’s hard work and stardom would be unfair.  Is the hard work 
expended over the lifetime of a performer like James Brown any 
more substantial than that taken to hone the art of photography by 
someone who took his picture?  Recognition of a celebrity’s labor re-
quires a mutual recognition of a photographer’s efforts.  The consti-
tutional concern for a photographer’s labor may be persuasive.  The 
basis of a photographer’s claim—copyright law—recognizes his 
unique contribution to his photographs. 
C. What About the Individual’s Motivations? 
A study of relevant case law suggests that the intent and motiva-
tions of the deceased celebrity should be examined.
176
  The opportu-
nity for fame and fortune certainly inspires many to perform in the 
beginning of a career.  But is the promise of celebrity, specifically the 
 
 174 See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287–96 (Peter Laslett 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
 175 See, e.g., Kevin M. Fisher, Comment, Which Path to Follow: A Comparative Perspec-
tive on the Right of Publicity, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 95, 97 (2000). 
 176 To say that a reasonably accurate determination of the deceased’s intent and 
feelings on the matter would allow courts to glean information leading to a potential-
ly more equitable judgment is fair; however, the reasonableness of determining the 
intentions of the dead is questionable.  In regard to the intentions of Elvis Presley, 
[t]he Sixth Circuit [in Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 
956 (6th Cir. 1980)] . . . provided a psychological analysis of the moti-
vations for achieving celebrity status, and concluded that the desire to 
pass along a right of publicity to one’s heirs likely is not a strong moti-
vation for becoming a celebrity.  In other words, Presley likely would 
have chosen fame and fortune, over being dirt poor regardless of 
whether the right of publicity was descendible. 
William A. Drennan, Wills, Trusts, Schadenfreude, and the Wild, Wacky Right of Publicity: 
Exploring the Enforceability of Dead-Hand Restrictions, 58 ARK. L. REV. 43, 79–80 (2005). 
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ability to bequeath the economic remuneration of one’s celebrity, a 
strong incentive for aspiring performers?  An adolescent at a piano 
lesson or football practice likely does not think that far ahead.  And 
someone like Marilyn Monroe, who had no prospect of a descendible 
right of publicity at the time of her death in 1962, would very likely 
not have imagined that California would enact a retroactive statute 
forty years later.  In the case of many of California’s celebrities, the 
ability to pass on their celebrity could not have motivated them at all.  
Celebrity photographers, on the other hand, are far more likely to be 
aware of and motivated by copyright protection.  Although a young 
photographer learning his craft may not be motivated by postmortem 
copyright protection, a professional with celebrity subjects certainly 
would be.  The photographer’s intentions should therefore be consi-
dered as well. 
Copyright’s finite protection is also meant to encourage creativi-
ty.  Unless the photographer knew that his work would be exclusively 
his for life plus seventy years, he may have less motivation to exert the 
time and energy needed to perfect his craft.  Allowing publicity rights 
to block licensing creates a disincentive for photographers to take ce-
lebrities’ pictures.  Photographers have little reason to outlay re-
sources without the promise of reward.  This stalemate renders copy-
right possession of celebrity photographs sterile.  It can also have a 
negative effect on celebrities, as their public awareness is dependent 
upon the recognition provided by the mass availability of their im-
age.
177
  Without a financial incentive for photographers, fewer pic-
tures of celebrities will be taken and, therefore, less overall “celebrity” 
will exist to go around. 
D. Public Perception of the Deceased 
The ability of a celebrity’s heirs to better control the public per-
ception of the deceased weighs in favor of a pro-publicity rights ap-
proach.  After a celebrity’s death, the only way for an estate to conti-
nually generate income is to maintain a positive public image and 
 
 177 This principle has been recognized regularly by courts in publicity-rights suits:  
Celebrities . . . are often not fully responsible for their fame.  Indeed, 
in the entertainment industry, a celebrity’s fame may largely be the 
creation of the media or the audience. . . .  As one actor put it, “Only 
that audience out there makes a star.  It’s up to them.  You can’t do 
anything about it . . . .  Stars would all be Louis B. Mayer’s cousins if 
you could make ‘em up.” 
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 975 (10th Cir. 
1996). 
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demand.  Because the celebrity can no longer produce new material 
after death, one’s persona and the public’s memory is the undercur-
rent of a strong revenue stream.  Likely, one’s estate has a better un-
derstanding of the celebrity’s interests and preferences than does a 
photographer.  If a photographer could license the celebrity’s image 
for any legitimate purpose, one bad apple could spoil the bunch.  
The inability of a dead celebrity to perform again or make a “come-
back” means that one poorly received association or endorsement 
could eradicate all future value in that persona.  Economically, the 
celebrity’s estate is favored in regard to maintaining the value of a 
deceased celebrity. 
E. The Luck Factor 
Becoming a celebrity often requires something more intangible 
than hard work and talent; it often requires significant amounts of 
luck.
178
  Luck comes in varying amounts and often is reciprocal to tal-
ent.  In cases of personalities like Paris Hilton and Kim Kardashian, 
who should certainly attribute a considerable portion of their celebri-
ty to luck, a photographer who has worked long and hard to master 
his art lays a strong claim to a copyrighted photograph of one of 
them.  In some circumstances, though, luck also plays into the hand 
of the photographer.  An example is the famous 1965 photograph 
taken by Neil Leifer of Muhammad Ali standing over a knocked-out 
Sonny Liston.
179
  In the photograph, one can see several other photo-
graphers attempting to capture the exact same shot as Leifer during a 
decisive moment in boxing’s history.  By a stroke of luck, Leifer’s im-
age is iconic and valuable, while the other photographers’ shots are 
not.  Ali was not posing for the picture,
180
 yet when he dies his heirs 
could make publicity claims to prevent certain uses of that photo-
graph.  Leifer’s photograph shows that luck not only makes celebri-
ties who they are but also makes some photographs what they are. 
F. Financial Reliance on Images 
Most celebrities neither make their living nor aspire to become 
famous from their photographs.  Musicians like James Brown become 
 
 178 See id.; see also NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN 30–31 (2007) (attribut-
ing actors’ success mostly to luck and randomness). 
 179 See Neil Leifer, Muhammad Ali Knocks Out Sonny Liston, May 25, 1965, 
http://www.artnet.com/artwork/424690130/149245/neil-leifer-muhammed-ali-
knocks-out-sonny-liston-may-25-1965.html. 
 180 The fact that the shot was taken amidst an Ali match, however, is significant. 
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famous and, therefore, derive value from their personality because of 
their music and performance abilities.  Actresses like Marilyn Monroe 
aspire to take on great roles that lead to fame and fortune.  These 
other, and usually chief, sources of income can provide economic 
stability for celebrities during their lives and for their estates after 
their deaths.  Photographers, on the other hand, rely on their photo-
graphs as their principle means of income.  The photograph itself is 
the art, and the subject is but one aspect of it.  Upon a photograph-
er’s death, he can no longer take pictures.  A photographer’s heirs, 
therefore, rely solely on the revenue provided by the pictures he took 
during his life.  When Muhammad Ali passes, his estate will have 
many opportunities to exploit his persona.
181
  When Neil Leifer 
passes, however, his heirs will have seventy years to derive income 
from his photograph before it becomes part of the public domain 
and loses significant value.  For the opportunistic Alis to deprive the 
dependent Leifers of their opportunity to exploit Neil’s work may be 
unfair. 
G. The Proposed Test 
Although a congressional act would immediately resolve this is-
sue, such a prospect is unlikely, and therefore, resolution is left to the 
judiciary.  But to adopt a bright-line rule in favor of either group un-
der all circumstances is not ideal.  Strict rules are easily applied by 
judges but not easily accepted by disfavored parties with legitimate 
claims.  The optimal result will be steeped in fairness yet manage to 
maximize overall value. 
When both the celebrity and the photographer have died, the 
photographer’s estate should prevail under most circumstances.  The 
photograph of the actor is the photographer’s art and contribution 
to the world, whereas the actor’s contribution is his acting.  Photo-
graphers’ estates should be afforded the right to exploit the images 
to enjoy the limited monopoly that copyright is designed to pro-
vide;
182
 however, this use cannot go unchecked. 
Deceased celebrities’ estates should have a right to bring suit but 
only when an image is used distastefully (not whenever an image is 
merely used).  Courts should adopt an objective/subjective test to 
make these determinations and enjoin copyright holders when a use 
 
 181 See, e.g., ALI (Columbia Pictures 2001). 
 182 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429–33 (1984) 
(discussing the limited monopoly granted to copyright holders). 
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is determined to be distasteful.  When an image is used in a way that 
the celebrity’s estate feels is either (1) objectively distasteful or (2) 
subjectively against the celebrity’s personal wishes or values, then the 
copyright holder should be enjoined from using the image in that 
manner. 
A trier of fact can employ an objective-use test to determine 
whether the image is being used in a way that is generally distasteful 
or disrespectful to the dead.
183
  One factor to be considered is wheth-
er the general public will likely have a negative association with that 
celebrity after the proposed use.  A successfully applied subjective test 
would place the burden on the celebrity’s estate to show that the ce-
lebrity’s opinions or values would have been in conflict with that use 
if she were still living.
184
  This approach would allow courts to make 
obvious determinations quickly and easily while allowing celebrities’ 
estates to fulfill the deceased’s individualized wishes. 
Courts could easily implement the proposed test, which would 
fulfill many of the goals of both copyright and publicity law in addi-
tion to potentially preventing costly and lengthy litigation.  Allowing 
photographers’ estates to exploit their photography in tasteful ways 
promotes the copyright goals of granting a limited monopoly and fos-
tering creativity.  Photographers have a limited monopoly on their 
images provided that they exploit them tastefully.  The test imposes 
no restraint on the photographer’s creativity while taking the pic-
tures.  The only potential imposition rests on the eventual use of the 
image, which is in line with the goal of publicity rights. 
Because the proposed test is rooted in equitable concerns, it not 
only protects copyright holding photographers but also values the 
contribution of celebrities.  The test does not prevent celebrities’ es-
tates from exploiting their image and, therefore, allows the estates to 
continue deriving value from the deceased’s fame.  It also breaks the 
 
 183 For example, if the image associated the celebrity with an objectively unattrac-
tive quality or habit, such as obesity or drug abuse, the court could enjoin that use 
fairly easily. 
 184 One could prove this by proffering some of the celebrity’s public or private 
statements, including journal entries and donations or involvement in causes that 
reflect the celebrity’s opposition to specific uses.  For example, copyright holders of 
images of Christopher Reeve, a well-known proponent of human-embryonic stem cell 
research after a paralyzing accident, would be enjoined from licensing his image for 
use in a campaign against stem cell research.  See Christopher and Dana Reeve 
Found., http://www.christopherreeve.org (last visited Feb. 3, 2010).  It could also 
allow the estate of a celebrity who seriously opposed exploitation of child labor in a 
third-world country to prevent that celebrity’s association with a company found to 
operate sweatshops. 
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current stalemate arising from the photographer’s attempt to exploit 
his photographs and the celebrity’s ability to assert her publicity 
rights in an effort to deny him.  The photographer’s ability to use the 
images can also be beneficial to deceased celebrities.  One of the ne-
cessary components of maintaining the value of a deceased personali-
ty is remaining in the public eye.  Photographers’ estates that exploit 
the celebrity’s image in tasteful ways would keep the celebrity rele-
vant and, therefore, would help the celebrity’s estate retain value 
through other means.  Finally, because photographers’ estates will 
want to avoid the costs and time of litigation, they would likely take 
the celebrity’s ideals into consideration before exploiting an image.  
This resolution promotes comity, consultation between estates before 
selling a license, and co-exploitation, all of which potentially amount 
to revenue for both parties through compromise. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Upon the recognition of competing legal interests, both the leg-
islature and judiciary can only evade an issue for so long before direct 
confrontation will occur.  In the case of the conflicting rights of de-
ceased celebrities and photographers, now is the time to address the 
legal stalemate concerning postmortem rights of publicity and copy-
right.  Adopting the proposed test will allow courts to successfully na-
vigate the murky waters of forthcoming litigation.  This proposal not 
only presents a means to resolve disputes, but it does so in a way that 
is in tune with the goals of both publicity rights and copyright law.  
Given the recent movement of increasing the duration of both of 
those rights after one’s death, this test will help resolve the increase 
in litigation involving such issues and will expectantly encourage 
comity between the estates of deceased celebrities and the photo-
graphers who helped them achieve and maintain their fame. 
 
